Abstract If the provision of public good is financed by property (wealth or endowment) taxes, what is the optimal tax mechanism when agents have private information about his own endowment? Employing the state-dependent implementation model, under incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints, we provide the full characterization of an optimal tax mechanism with two agents and its properties. Some interesting comparative statics analyses are also provided. For the general n-agent case, some partial characterization results are obtained. In addition, we fully characterize the optimal tax mechanism for the corresponding infinitely large economy.
Introduction
This paper is motivated by a practical property taxation problem: for a public good economy where the provision of public goods is to be financed by property taxes collected from individuals, what is the optimal feasible tax mechanism when a social planner is relatively uninformed of the properties of the individuals? 1 In this case, the I thank Professor Tomas Sjöström for his invaluable guidance and comments. I also thank Professors Kalyan Chatterjee, Steven Huddart, James Jordan, Neil Wallace and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am indebted to the seminar participants at FEES 2004, KAPFE, and PET 2005 . Of course, all remaining errors are mine.
B. Rhee (B) ERI, The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, Seoul, Republic of Korea e-mail: brhee@bai.go.kr problem is that the social planner has to take into account not only the individuals' incentive to report their wealth truthfully, but also the individual feasibility of the designed tax schedule in the sense that each individual's tax payment should be consistent with their ability to pay. In particular, this kind of problem, optimal private provision of public goods, is frequently observed in a small economy such as a club or village. 2 Consider the following example. Two thieves, Ali and Baba, want to build a door for their treasure cave. The quality of the door depends on the total contributions they make. Suppose that Ali is relatively rich and has $200, and Baba is relatively poor and has $100, but that none of them knows how much the other has. A social planner, who does not know how much Ali and Baba have, asks them to report their wealth in order to determine their contributions (taxes). What is the optimal feasible tax mechanism that maximizes the expected sum of utilities? If the social planner wants to collect $300 for the door-building, she cannot impose $150 to each of the two thieves because it is not (individually) feasible to Baba.
The theory of optimal taxation has a long history. Since the seminal work by Mirrlees (1971), the optimal taxation literature has studied the incentive aspect of a tax mechanism and established many characterization results under a variety of economic situations. 3 Mirrlees (1971) considers a labor income taxation problem for an infinitely large economy and studies the optimality of redistributive taxation when each individual has private information about his own productivity. He shows that the redistributive tax mechanism is subject to suboptimality due to the informational asymmetry between the public policy authority and the individuals. This situation is now well understood as a second best taxation. Following Mirrlees (1971), many authors have analyzed a trade-off between efficiency and equity of optimal income taxation. Other authors have studied the optimal taxation problem from the implementation perspective (Guesnerie 1995; Piketty 1993 among others). However, most of these works have assumed that there is a continuum of individuals and the tax schedule depends on an observable variable such as labor income so that there are no individual feasibility or bankruptcy problems.
Implementation (or mechanism design) theory, pioneered by Hurwicz (1972) and Maskin (1999) , studies the implementability of various social choice rules and the characterization of the implementing mechanisms under different environments and informational assumptions. 4 Most of results in this literature, however, assume that the set of feasible outcomes is fixed and common knowledge so that this set does not depend on the realization of the economic environment. This is a quite restrictive assumption, in particular, when agents have private information about their own endowments or production technologies. If a social planner is relatively uninformed of the realization of agents' endowments, she has to consider the feasibility problem when designing an implementing mechanism. The first study to explicitly tackle this
